Monthly revenue
~₹44K ~₹11.6L
Month one to the April 2026 peak.
~26× in nine months
Bajaj Finserv Health’s first e-commerce product. A wellness marketplace built from zero, with a B2B2C wallet as the hook.
Four product types in one build: supplements and smart devices alongside in-house programs and subscriptions.
Monthly revenue
~₹44K ~₹11.6L
Month one to the April 2026 peak.
~26× in nine months
~₹66L
Revenue
Year one, Phase 1 and 1.2.
26%
Margin
On ~₹17L profit.
~940
Orders
Across all four product types.
~₹37L
Top earner
A fitness membership tie-up. Programs led.
Three levels, each answering the one above it
There was no single place in the app to sell nutra supplements, its own health programs, wellness devices or vouchers.
The wallet made the gap visible. Credit was scoped to appointments and lab tests, so members held a balance with nothing else to spend it on. For supplements, devices and memberships, they went elsewhere.
Primary · B2B2C members
Employees on a Health Prime plan their employer bought. They arrive with preloaded wallet credit and exclusive pricing.
Also · GMC groups
Members covered under Group Medical Coverage, reached through the same plan structure.
Three barriers, each assigned to a design objective
Before the storeWhat was needed
Supplements · Smart devices · Programs · Subscriptions · Vouchers · Wallet for appointments and lab tests only
For supplements, devices and memberships, members went elsewhere.One cart, one checkout, and wallet credit that finally had somewhere to go.
What one storefront had to hold
Four content models on two sources, several vendors in one cart, and a wallet that had to apply across all of it.
Traditional e-commerce
The conventions a buyer already knows, and the depth a catalog is expected to have.
Quick-commerce
Wellness restocking behaves like groceries. Speed, repeat and a cart that never leaves the screen.





Wellness needs both: enough structure to choose a health program, enough habit to restock a protein tub.
Fig. 01 · The architecture
Products come from vendor APIs, programs from an internal CMS.
One card system over both sources.
The paths differ in what they ask you to choose.
One cart holds several vendors.
The split the backend has to make never surfaces to the member.
Fig. 02
Four tabs, one level of category, two detail types, one transaction path. Every screen in the journeys below sits somewhere on this map.
Decision 01


Decision 02
What the member sees
What the backend does
Decision 03
The barrier was price: the discount should never be a surprise at the end. So wallet value stays visible end to end, not revealed at checkout.





Discovery · 01
A persistent header balance, from the first tile. Blinkit leads with delivery minutes; we had none to promise, so the header carries the balance instead.
Discovery · 02
Member pricing on every card, in the slot Flipkart uses for price and strike-through. Two treatments were drawn: a plain Wallet Applicable flag, and the member price stated outright.
Selection · 03
On the product page the member price sits beside the MRP.
Cart and checkout · 04
Live total recalculation in the cart. At checkout, wallet, Health Coins and UPI combine, and each deduction is itemised at payment.
After purchase · 05
Behind them a Store Wallet screen: balance against allocation, total saved, every transaction. Not a discount that appears at the end.



Interpretation The wallet is the B2B2C differentiator and the spine of the store’s value proposition. It launched late in Phase 1 and remains early-volume, a strategic bet rather than a proven driver.








Step 05 ran as a loop, not a stage. Feedback went back into the UX before anything was committed to final design.
Behind the scenes


Most of the work was smaller than a decision. Choosing a stepper over a chip. Extending a healthcare component instead of drawing a new one. Moving a balance eight pixels so it clears the wordmark. The three calls above are what survived; this is the middle they came out of.
Measured a business figure for the period Interpretation a reading of what it means
~₹66L
Revenue in year one Measured
Phase 1 and 1.2.
26%
Margin Measured
On ~₹17L profit.
~940
Orders Measured
Spread across all four product types.
Fig. 03 · Monthly revenue, ₹ lakh Measured
| Month | Revenue (₹L) |
|---|---|
| July 2025 | 0.4 |
| August 2025 | 2.2 |
| September 2025 | 4.2 |
| October 2025 | 4.0 |
| November 2025 | 4.3 |
| December 2025 | 3.4 |
| January 2026 | 3.8 |
| February 2026 | 6.3 |
| March 2026 | 10.5 |
| April 2026 (peak) | 11.6 |
| May 2026 | 9.4 |
| June 2026 | 4.2 |
Interpretation On attribution
Revenue reflects catalog, pricing and marketing alongside design. Design supported this outcome; it did not solely cause it.
Observed
Revenue peaked in April, then softened for three straight months.
Hypothesis
Inconsistent, low-quality vendor photography was eroding trust at the point of decision.
The catalog arrived through vendor tie-ups, so the imagery was never the design team’s to control, and chasing vendors for better images was neither fast nor reliable.
Proposed
Brand Pages: brand-owned banners, curated collections, shop by concern, shop by product type.
Not yet validated
Ship Phase 2 and measure whether the trust fix reverses the softening.




Brand page, in full
The end of the journey and the whole point of it.
The banner, the product lineup and the discount bands are merchandising design controls, sitting where an unreliable vendor photograph used to carry the decision.
It doubles as a browse surface: shop by product type, top deals, curated rows. One page answering both trust and discovery.
The org prioritised it into development. It has not shipped, so there is nothing here to claim.

I had to take the DLS apart component by component to see what could carry commerce and what had to be rebuilt. Extending a system I had not pulled apart first would have been guesswork, and the guesses would have shipped.
User feedback kept pointing at familiarity rather than novelty. Each round told me where people expected something they had seen before, and the flow got simpler every time I listened to that.
Four content models, several vendors and a split payment were never the member’s problem. One card system, one cart and one order ID kept the vendor split invisible through the entire post-purchase experience.
Annotating every screen and shipping an asset file alongside it did more for delivery than any handover meeting. It made the work easier for me and for the dev team, and it took most of the back and forth out of the build.
The ASAP go-live made reuse the brief: vouchers as a fast-follow, personalization deferred. Designing to what engineering could ship was the job, not a compromise.

Phase 2 home · in development